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Although the secret ballot has long been secured as a legal matter in the United States, formal secrecy
protections are not equivalent to convincing citizens that they may vote privately and without fear
of reprisal. We present survey evidence that those who have not previously voted are particularly likely
to voice doubts about the secrecy of the voting process. We then report results from a field experiment
where we provided registered voters with information about ballot secrecy protections prior to the
2010 general election. We find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records
of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted.
These results suggest that although the secret ballot is a long-standing institution in the United States,
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Fair and open elections in which eligible citizens can cast ballots as they see fit are a defining 
characteristic of legitimate democratic systems. The secret ballot is generally thought of as an essential 
institution for protecting voters from fear of intimidation or coercion in these contests.
1 Indeed, in the 
United States, the adoption of the secret ballot is viewed as a landmark progressive reform.
2 In this paper, 
we argue that although the secret ballot has been secured as a legal matter, formal institutions and 
practices to protect ballot secrecy are not equivalent to convincing citizens that they may vote privately 
and without fear of reprisal. This distinction between legal protections and beliefs is essential, because it 
is a citizen’s beliefs about electoral institutions—and not the formal operation of those institutions—that 
will affect her actions. While some previous work has examined the historical consequences of the formal 
implementation of the secret ballot, little work has considered the potential relationship between beliefs 
about ballot secrecy and contemporary voting behavior (but see Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 
2011a). 
We provide evidence that, even in the contemporary U.S.—a longstanding democracy that has 
used the secret ballot for over 100 years—doubts about ballot secrecy are surprisingly widespread. This 
                                                      
1 Indeed, Article 25 of United Nations’ Civil and Political Covenant considers the secret ballot a crucial 
component of a fair electoral process (Franck 1992, 64). 
2 There is a voluminous literature on the history of the adoption and spread of the Australian (secret) 
ballot. For example, see Benson (1941), Dowling (2008), Evans (1917), Gerber (1994), Fredman (1968), 
Rusk (1970), and Wigmore (1889). For related work in the comparative context, see Schaffer (1998) and 
Stokes (2005). Some scholars have argued that there may have been other motivations for the adoption of 
the secret ballot (e.g., attempts to entrench a majority party by eliminating the possibility of vote-buying 
by opposition parties, see Burnham 1970; Kousser 1974) and other consequences of its implementation 
(e.g., it appeared to benefit incumbents, see Heckelman and Yates 2002; Heckelman 2004, and may have 
resulted in lower turnout because of the loss of the direct benefits vote-buying provided to voters, see 
Heckelman 1995; 2000). 2 
long experience coupled with the practice of professional election administration suggest that the United 
States should be a difficult case for finding such doubts relative to more recent democracies. Despite this 
long history, we present results from a new opinion survey that shows many Americans have doubts 
about the secrecy of the ballot and that these doubts are more prevalent among inexperienced citizens 
(those who have never voted) than among those who have previously participated. Building on the results 
from this opinion survey, we designed a large-scale, randomized field experiment that was conducted in 
cooperation with the Connecticut Secretary of State.
3 This experiment allows us to test the effects of 
providing registered voters with information about ballot secrecy protections. 
We find that beliefs about the secrecy and anonymity of the voting process have real 
consequences for political participation. In particular, the experiment shows that providing information 
about the anonymity of the ballot and the protections against intimidation at the polls to those who had 
not previously voted increased turnout in the November 2010 election by an estimated 3.4 percentage 
points. This represents a substantial increase in turnout for this group—proportionally the intervention 
increases turnout by about 20 percent. The estimates of these effects are larger than the estimates of both 
a placebo intervention that did not include information about ballot secrecy and a similarly designed 
intervention that emphasized the civic responsibility associated with voting. By contrast, for those who 
had previously voted, providing information about ballot secrecy protections appears to have negligible 
effects on participation, particularly when compared to other get out the vote interventions. These 
differences in effects across groups are consistent with the survey evidence showing doubts about ballot 
secrecy are more prevalent among those who have not previously voted. They also suggest that doubts 
                                                      
3 None of the costs of this research project were born by the Secretary of State. Partnering with state 
administrative agencies to assess the effect of information about government procedures is an important 
contribution of this paper and follows on the work of others (e.g., Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod 
2001; Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian 2001). 3 
about ballot secrecy may discourage political participation for this segment of the population, regardless 
of how elections are actually conducted within statutory and administrative rules. 
Our findings have three broad implications for understanding the nature and consequences of 
mass behavior. First, we demonstrate the importance of beliefs about political institutions in explaining 
mass behavior. Institutions may effectively accomplish goals such as protecting the secrecy of the ballot. 
However, mechanically achieving these goals may not be enough if citizens are unaware of these 
institutions or do not believe that they work. Our findings suggest that as states and counties across the 
United States move to implement convenience voting, voting by mail, electronic voting, and other new 
voting procedures, more careful attention should be paid to not only the design and operation of these new 
electoral institutions (see, e.g., Alvarez and Hall 2010 on electronic voting), but also to beliefs about each 
new institution’s operation. We show that Americans harbor doubts of meaningful consequence for real 
political behavior even about the long-standing, well-used, and well-known institution of polling place 
elections.  
A second and related contribution is to show that interventions that focus purely on providing 
information can allay citizens’ (mistaken) beliefs about the operation of institutions and thereby mobilize 
these citizens. Importantly, our simple intervention mobilized not just any citizen, but a group of eligible 
citizens who is often targeted by those seeking to increase political participation: those who were 
registered, but had not previously participated in elections. Efforts to convert these registrants to new 
voters is a promising step for reducing turnout disparities, particularly given evidence that turnout is itself 
habit forming (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Our evidence suggests that providing reassurances 
about the anonymity and protection of the voting process can bring new voters to the polls, and that these 
effects are larger than more typical GOTV messages that emphasize the civic responsibility of voting.  
Finally, this research is, we believe, an example of successful multi-stage social scientific 
research. Specifically, by pairing survey findings with a field experiment we are able to demonstrate not 
only that people voice doubts about ballot secrecy, but that the doubts expressed in the survey context are 
meaningful and remediable by simple dissemination of basic information. Additionally, comparing the 4 
effects of these interventions with similar efforts that do not address concerns about ballot secrecy allows 
us to pinpoint the importance of ballot secrecy concerns in explaining low rates of participation. This 
project therefore provides a template for combining survey data findings with experimental evidence. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we first briefly outline our 
expectations for how beliefs about ballot secrecy may be associated with political participation. We then 
discuss our survey results about the nature of doubts about ballot secrecy and our particular interest in 
those citizens who have never previously voted. Next, we describe our experimental design and then 
discuss the results of our analysis. The final section identifies some extensions to our work, its limitations, 
and the broader implications of our findings. 
I.  Beliefs about Ballot Secrecy and Political Participation 
Scholarship on turnout in advanced democracies implicitly assumes that the formal institution of 
the secret ballot is sufficient to remedy any concerns about ballot secrecy that might discourage 
participation. Despite extensive research on the causes and correlates of turnout, such an assumption has 
not, to our knowledge, been subject to rigorous empirical review. In the United States, for example, 
political scientists have offered many explanations for why some citizens do not participate, including 
individual-level differences (e.g., socioeconomic status [Milbrath and Goel 1977; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980], genetics [Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008], personality [Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, Raso, and Ha 2011], political socialization [Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; 
Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003; Plutzer 2002], etc.), campaign effects (e.g., campaign mobilization 
[Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Gerber and Green 2000; Green and Gerber 2008], negative campaigning 
[Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Finkel and Geer 1998], etc.), social pressure (Gerber, Green, and 
Larimer 2008), and political institutions (e.g., the rules for translating votes into seats [Jackman 1987; 
Powell 1986], restrictions on who and how individuals may register and vote [Powell 1986; Timpone 
1998; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980], and the process of voting itself like the availability and location 
of polling locations [Brady and McNulty 2011]). Although the effects of de jure electoral institutions 5 
such as registration rules have been investigated, the effects of actual citizen beliefs about the institutions, 
which may be in conflict with de jure reality, have been the subject of less focus. 
In a recent paper however, Gerber et al. (2011a) suggest that formal rules about ballot secrecy 
may not be sufficient to allay citizen concerns about the voting process. That paper focuses on the 
implications for vote choice if citizens are concerned about the anonymity of the voting process. Gerber 
and colleagues contend that the decisions people make in the voting booth may be affected by social or 
group influences if they believe those choices may be revealed (through either monitoring of how they fill 
out their ballot or, after the fact, by matching the cast ballot to their name), a common factor noted in 
explaining voter decision-making in the pre-secret ballot era (e.g., Bensel 2004; Bishop 1893). 
What has received less attention in prior work is that fears about a lack of secrecy may also deter 
political participation.
4 Although previous research suggests that the social consequences of failing to 
participate may play an important role in encouraging turnout (e.g., Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008; 
Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2011b), if citizens have doubts about the voting process, then the 
perceived threat of social consequences may also depress turnout. For example, citizens may worry that 
they will suffer direct sanctions for the choices they make when voting if those choices are revealed and 
instead choose to shield themselves from these sanctions by staying home on Election Day. Similarly, 
doubts about secrecy may cause voters to think that the process of voting involves direct conflict, possible 
embarrassment, or intimidation—that when voting they will have to justify their choices or will be 
challenged by those who disagree with them. Such potential conflict or stress can be avoided by 
abstention. These dynamics may be an example of the ways in which the powerful act to entrench 
themselves by suppressing the expression of discontent in the first place (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz 1962; 
Gaventa 1982).  
                                                      
4 Heckelman (1995) contends that the adoption of the secret ballot in the U.S. may have diminished 
turnout historically because, without the ability to verify vote choices, secrecy eliminated the ability of 
parties and candidates to offer payments (bribes) to voters for voting for a particular candidate.  6 
Although views about a lack of ballot secrecy are expressed in survey data by around one quarter 
of the population (Gerber et al. 2011a), a key question is whether these beliefs are real and consequential. 
On the one hand, survey responses indicating doubts about secrecy, because they are costless to express, 
may be efforts by non-voters to justify lack of participation. On the other hand, those beliefs may be real 
but uncorrectable or irrelevant—even after being told that voting is secret, these citizens may not change 
their attitudes or might still stay home for other reasons. We investigate both possibilities. 
New Survey Evidence on Beliefs about Ballot Secrecy 
Building on Gerber and colleagues’ earlier work, we fielded a survey after the 2010 midterm 
election to assess citizens’ beliefs about the process of voting, both generally and with respect to ballot 
secrecy concerns.
5 The results suggest that concerns about ballot secrecy are particularly widespread 
among those who have never voted. The survey asked respondents who reported having ever voted a 
series of questions about their experience the last time they voted. Those who had never voted before 
were asked analogous questions about their expectations for what the voting experience would be like if 
they were to vote. In Figure 1, we summarize responses to four of the questions we asked, which are 
representative of the entire set of questions we asked. The figure displays the proportion of respondents 
(weighted to reflect a national sample) who responded “Yes” (white part of the bars), “Don’t Know” or 
“Don’t Remember” (light gray part of the bars), and “No” (dark gray part of the bars) to each statement, 
broken down by whether they reported having ever voted.
6  
[Figure 1 About Here] 
                                                      
5 Polimetrix/YouGov completed on our behalf a survey of a nationally representative sample of 3,000 
citizens 25-years and older in the month following the November 2010 election. 
6 Among ever-voters, the sample is restricted to those whose last reported vote was in person (early or on 
Election Day). Nineteen percent of survey respondents reported voting absentee, by mail, or could not 
recall how they last voted. 7 
These data show that those who report never having voted before are more likely than those who 
report having voted to believe (1) that they would write their name on their ballot (13 versus 6% among 
all respondents), (2) that some information on their ballot could be used to match it to them after the fact 
(20 versus 11%), (3) that someone at the polling place would ask them who they voted for (12 versus 
3%), and (4) that a poll worker would be able to see who they voted for (8 versus 3%). We also note that 
for each item, over one-third of non-voters gave a “Don’t Know” response, and that these responses also 
suggest doubts and uncertainty about the secrecy of the voting process. In this light, if we restrict our 
attention to those who offered a “Yes” or “No” response to the questions displayed in Figure 1 the 
differences between Ever-Voters and Non-Voters are even more stark. Specifically, the percentages 
responding “Yes” (of “Yes” and “No” responses) to each of the four items are for Never-Voters and Ever-
Voters, respectively, (1) 20 versus 6%, (2) 32 versus 13%, (3) 20 versus 3%, and (4) 12 versus 3%. In 
sum, the findings presented in Figure 1 broadly suggest that those who do not have experience voting are 
substantially less likely to believe that the ballots voters cast are anonymous and more likely to believe 
that voters may divulge their choices to people they encounter at the polling place. These perceptions, 
which are interesting in their own right, may help to explain their lack of participation on Election Day.  
An extant experimental literature highlights the importance of social and experiential concerns, 
like the ones we suggest may operate here, in explaining participation. For example, Addonizio (2004) 
shows that exposing inexperienced voters (high school students) to the process of voting by having them 
walk through a mock polling place and practice voting increases subsequent turnout. This effect is 
consistent with non-voters being dissuaded from participating by lack of knowledge of the process, which 
may include beliefs that one’s vote will not be kept secret. Other work finds that making the negative 
social consequences of being revealed as not having voted more salient increases participation (Gerber, 
Green, and Larimer 2008; follow-on work includes Davenport 2010; Davenport, Gerber, Green, Larimer, 
Mann, and Panagopoulos 2010; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2010; Mann 2010; Panagopoulos 2010).
7 
                                                      
7 This focus on revealing whether someone has complied with a positive social norm is in contrast to a 8 
What remains unknown is whether directly addressing doubts about ballot secrecy would alter voter 
behavior. 
II.  Experimental Design 
In order to investigate whether beliefs about ballot secrecy affect the decision to participate, we 
designed and implemented a randomized field experiment in Connecticut during the 2010 midterm 
election. To assess the particular importance of beliefs about ballot secrecy on turnout, we implemented a 
variety of interventions, each of which was a mailing that conveyed different information. The design 
included both a non-treated (no mailing) control group and a set of placebo treatments, which we detail 
below. Our outcome of interest is participation in the 2010 general election held on November 2, 2010. 
We measure participation using turnout as recorded in the Connecticut voter file. 
The theory and survey evidence outlined above suggest that individuals who have not previously 
participated are most likely to hold beliefs about ballot secrecy that would deter participation. To the 
extent that these beliefs are incongruent with the experiences of voters and the practice of 
professionalized election administration, we hypothesize that delivering corrective information might 
reduce concerns about the secrecy of the voting process and increase the likelihood of voting. For this 
reason, we stratified our experimental design to allow us to more precisely estimate the effects of 
information about ballot secrecy on those active Connecticut registrants who have not previously voted. 
We also assess the effects of our treatments on those who had previously voted to test our assumption that 
beliefs about secrecy were most important for current non-voters. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
field experiment reported in Grose and Russell (2008). Grose and Russell find that telling voters before 
the Iowa Caucus that their vote in the caucus is not secret reduces turnout by about 22 percentage points 
relative to an identical treatment that emphasizes that their friends and neighbors will also be present but 
lacks the information about voting not being secret (N=232 for these two treatments). Among potential 
caucus goers, this suggests that being reminded of the potential for open disagreement with neighbors and 
friends in one’s party reduces turnout. 9 
The experiment proceeded in four stages, each of which is detailed in Table 1. In Stage 1 we 
identified our eligible sample, beginning with a list of all voters in the Connecticut voter file produced by 
the Connecticut Secretary of State in June 2010. From this list we removed all individuals who 1) were 
listed as inactive, 2) lacked a valid current Connecticut mailing address (including failing to pass a 
National Change of Address [NCOA] filter), or 3) had their mail delivered to a post office box.
8 The first 
restriction removes registrants who were ineligible to vote. The latter restrictions focus on making sure 
recipients would be likely to receive a mailing sent in the days preceding the election. Similarly, we 
eliminated any voter who voted by absentee ballot in 2006, 2008, or 2010 because many of these 
individuals may have already voted at the time the mailing was sent. We also removed any registrants less 
than 18 years of age or over the age of 85 out of concern that they would be unlikely to participate. 
Finally, we removed records from households with more than five registrants at a single address because 
these individuals are likely to live in temporary (e.g., school dorms) or group housing where mail would 
be less likely to be delivered on time. From this pool of eligible registrants, if there were multiple eligible 
registrants from a single household (address), we randomly selected a single representative registrant. 
This sampling procedure yielded 894,791 eligible registrants in unique households. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
In Stage 2 we identified our three treatment strata and assigned treatments. Each stratum is a 
stand-alone group of registrants on which the experiment is run, allowing us to estimate separate 
treatment effects for each group. Our first stratum is recent registrants—those who registered after the 
2004 general election—who had never voted. We label this stratum recently registered non-voters. The 
second stratum is earlier registrants (registered prior to the 2004 general election) who had also never 
voted. We label this stratum longstanding registered non-voters. We believe that those who had not 
                                                      
8 The United States Postal Service provides a National Change of Address service that checks a name and 
address against the USPS list of changed addresses. This service, provided for fees by licensees, helps 
reduce undeliverable mailings. 10 
previously participated are most likely to hold concerns about election administration that deter 
participation. However, we separate these non-voters into two groups for reasons of efficiency: Those 
who registered prior to 2004 but have never voted are less likely to reside now at the address listed on the 
voter file.
9  
We define our third stratum as those who were listed to have ever voted in any election in the 
voter file. We label this stratum ever-voters. Recently registered non-voters make up about 9 percent of 
our targeted sample, longstanding registered non-voters about 9 percent, and ever-voters the remaining 
82 percent. Although we ran all registrants for the first two strata through the NCOA list, for reasons of 
cost we randomly selected a subset of ever-voters to verify their addresses. Our sample of registrants that 
passed the NCOA check is 69,488 recently registered non-voters, 68,859 longstanding registered non-
voters, and 18,586 ever-voters. For each of the three strata, summary statistics for all demographic 
covariates available in the voter file appear in Appendix Table A1.
10 
Consistent with their status as recent registrants who have never voted, the most notable 
difference across strata in demographics is that recently registered non-voters are much younger than 
those in the other strata (their average age is only 38, relative to 52 among the ever-voters). Along with 
                                                      
9 These registrants are also more likely to have moved prior to the 18 month retrospective window 
covered by the NCOA review. Additionally, we have also since learned that local party organizations in 
some jurisdictions may have been motivated to keep these registrants on the rolls even if they were no 
longer physically present in order to increase their representation in the state party organizations where 
positions are assigned, in part, on the basis of the number of party registrants in each jurisdiction. 
10 All variables used for our stratum definitions are derived from the Connecticut statewide voter file, so 
to the extent there exist inaccuracies in the file, measurement error is introduced. We note, however, that 
the most likely error is that previous voters who re-registered may not have been linked to their prior vote 
history records. If this is the case, then to the extent we have misclassified ever-voters as non-voters our 
findings about non-voters are biased toward those for ever-voters. 11 
this difference in age, they are less likely to live in a two-person voter household. Also consistent with 
their records in the voter file being newer, they are less likely to have their gender listed as missing. 
Finally, they are less likely than either longstanding registered non-voters or ever-voters to have affiliated 
with either the Democratic or Republican Parties. 
In Stage 3, we randomly assigned each registrant to one of eight conditions within each stratum.
11 
Each treatment was a letter, described in greater detail below. Letters were mailed on October 28 to arrive 
between October 29 and November 1, approximately 1 to 4 days prior to the election. We sent a total of 
16,556 treatment letters. In order to enable us to detect small effects in our primary target stratum 
(recently registered non-voters), we significantly under-weighted the share of the feasible treatments sent 
to longstanding registered non-voters in favor of treating a larger share of the recently registered non-
voters. We allocated approximately 32 percent (5,357) of our treatments to the recently registered non-
voters stratum (a within stratum overall treatment rate of 7.7 percent). We assigned 5 percent (836) of the 
treatments to the longstanding registered non-voters stratum (a treatment rate of 1.2 percent) and 63 
percent to the much larger ever-voters stratum (a treatment rate of 55.8 percent of the ever-voters checked 
against the NCOA list). Balance statistics (summary statistics for all demographic variables) for control 
and each treatment group in all strata appear in Table 2 (recently registered non-voters in Table 2a, 
longstanding registered non-voters in Table 2b, and ever-voters in Table 2c). To test for observable 
differences between treatment and control groups we performed a multinomial logit for each strata using 
information available at the time of treatment assignment to predict assignment. We compared the chi-
square test statistic for the joint significance of all variables available at the time of assignment to the 
                                                      
11 Within each stratum, randomization took place within blocks. Subject to rounding, equal proportions 
were assigned to treatments across blocks in each stratum. In all strata, we blocked on residence for the 6 
largest towns (plus a remainder category for respondents not living in those towns). For the two strata 
composed of those who had never voted, we also blocked on age (in 5 year increments). In the ever-voters 
stratum, we also blocked on vote history in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 general elections. 12 
distribution of the statistic across a set of 2000 bootstrapped alternative random treatment assignments to 
conduct an exact randomization test. The p-value for the location of the test statistic in the distribution of 
test statistics from the randomization test appears at the bottom of Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c. We present the 
full distribution of the bootstrapped test statistics in Appendix Figure A1. A detailed summary of 
treatment assignment counts by strata appears in Table 3. 
[Tables 2 and 3 About Here] 
Description of Treatments 
We partnered with the Connecticut Secretary of State to send informational letters to our sampled 
registered voters. Six of our seven treatment letters appeared on Secretary of State letterhead. Our primary 
interest is in how perceptions of ballot secrecy influence participation, and three of our treatment letters 
addressed concerns about ballot secrecy. The first, SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity), was sent on Secretary of 
State letterhead and emphasized how the choices a voter made in the voting booth would be kept secret by 
including the following text: 
We maintain the secrecy of the ballot. Poll workers keep only a list of who voted, not how they 
voted. No record of how you or any other voter filled out their ballot is created other than your 
anonymous ballot. Your choices cannot be matched up with your name. Additionally, voting 
booths provide a private place for you to fill out your ballot. You place your ballot into the voting 
machine on top of the locked ballot box without anyone else looking at it. 
The second treatment letter, SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation), was similar to the first intervention 
but emphasized a different element of secrecy in the voting process. It focused on the fact that voters are 
not required to reveal or explain their choices to poll workers and that campaigns cannot be active in 
polling places. In place of the paragraph listed above, it read: 
We make sure that you can vote free from intimidation. A set of rules is enforced at each 
polling place to ensure that voters are comfortable casting votes for whomever they prefer. For 
example, poll workers are not permitted to ask who you voted for, and campaigning is prohibited 
inside of or near polling places. 
Finally, the third secrecy intervention, SOS Secrecy Combined, included both paragraphs of text from the 
SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) and SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) treatments. Because each argument 13 
addresses a different area of concern, it was our expectation that the combined effect of this mailing 
would be larger than the effect of each of the two interventions alone. 
Because of random assignment, comparing individuals assigned to the control group with those 
sent each of the letters that addresses secrecy concerns yields an unbiased estimate of the effect of those 
interventions. However, one concern is that if these letters are effective in increasing turnout, it may not 
be because of their particular content concerning ballot secrecy. Each letter was addressed to the 
individual registrant on Secretary of State letterhead and also included information that there was an 
election occurring on November 2, 2010. In order to help isolate the effects of information about ballot 
secrecy from the effect of receiving election-related mail from the Secretary of State, we also fielded two 
“placebo” treatments. SOS Short, which was also sent on Secretary of State letterhead, is identical to the 
three secrecy letters but lacks any text addressing concerns about ballot secrecy.  
Because it lacks any text addressing ballot secrecy concerns, the SOS Short letter is shorter than 
any of the secrecy letters. To ensure that any differences in treatment effects were not due to the amount 
of text, we also fielded SOS Control, which is a longer version of SOS Short with information about the 
role of the Secretary of State in election administration unrelated to ballot secrecy.
12 In particular, it 
included this text: 
We implement state and federal laws. The Legislation and Elections Administration Division 
of the Office of the Secretary of State administers, interprets, and implements all state and federal 
laws pertaining to elections, primaries, and nominating procedures. We also oversee the 
acquisition and exercise of voting rights, and supervise the statewide tabulation of voting results 
after each election. 
We assist elected officials. Along with local Town Clerks and Registrars of Voters, my office 
provides training for local elected officials. In addition, our office is the official keeper of all acts, 
orders, grants and resolutions of the General Assembly. We also receive and maintain legislation, 
regulations, and a wide range of other public documents. 
We note that, like the secrecy interventions, this letter makes clear the SOS office’s interest in election 
administration. 
                                                      
12 This text was produced based on information available on the office of the Connecticut’s Secretary of 
State’s public website. 14 
Our last two treatments are the SOS Civic Duty and Generic Civic Duty letters. SOS Civic Duty 
adds to the SOS Short letter standard text focusing on the civic duty associated with voting: 
Voting is a right and responsibility. I want to remind you to exercise your right to vote this 
November. The right to vote is an important American tradition. The whole point of democracy is 
that citizens are active participants in government and democracy functions best when everyone 
takes part in the voting process. This November, remember your rights and responsibilities as a 
citizen.  
Your voice starts with your vote. Voting is one of the most important ways citizens have to 
make their voices heard. By taking the time to do their civic duty, voters ensure that elected 
leaders know what they think and how they feel. I encourage you to take the time to fulfill your 
civic duty by voting on November 2
nd. 
This is a standard GOTV intervention and is typically associated with a less than one percentage point 
increase in turnout in midterm elections (Green and Gerber 2008). As such, we use it to compare the 
effects of the secrecy interventions to a more standard GOTV appeal. The text of Generic Civic Duty is 
identical, but is sent under cover of “Connecticut Votes” rather than the Secretary of State.
13 
We gathered information about participation in the 2010 election from an updated Connecticut 
voter file from February of 2011. For participants listed in this voter file, turnout was coded 1 if the 
respondent voted in the 2010 general election and 0 if not. For respondents who were no longer listed in 
the updated voter file, turnout was coded 0.
14 In Figure 2, we present a diagram describing the design of 
the experiment from sample definition through population filters and random assignment.
15 
                                                      
13 Comparing these last two treatments allows us to assess whether there are any increased mobilization 
effects associated with mail delivered under the Secretary of State’s letterhead relative to a non-
governmental GOTV group, an analysis we conduct in other work. 
14 Excluding the 507 out of 894,791 registrants in our target population who did not match to the post-
election file, rather than coding their turnout as zero, does not substantively change any of the results 
presented. 
15 We collected and recorded each mailed treatment letter returned as undeliverable by the US Postal 
Service—780 of 16,556 (4.7% of) mailed letters were returned. Analysis restricted to those respondents 
whose mail (i.e., excluding the control group, comparing across treatments) was not returned produces 15 
[Figure 2 About Here] 
III.  Analysis 
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. We begin by comparing, for each stratum, the effect of 
receiving any of the individual secrecy mailings to being in the control group, to which no mail was sent. 
This analysis employs the entire sample for which treatment randomization took place. Next, we compare 
the effect of receiving any of the three secrecy mailings to the effect of the other (placebo) SOS mailings 
and to the civic duty mailings. These comparisons showing the relative effectiveness of the secrecy 
messages are necessarily limited only to those sent letters. Our results show that informing voters of the 
formal institutional protections of ballot secrecy increased participation among registrants who had not 
previously voted, but had negligible effects on those who had previously voted. The positive estimated 
effects of the secrecy intervention among inexperienced voters hold when comparing them to the control 
group and to either a civic duty intervention or to a placebo intervention with non-secrecy content. 
The Effects of Information About Ballot Secrecy 
Table 4 shows 2010 turnout by control and treatment assignment for each stratum. As one might 
expect given the habitual nature of voting and the definitions we use for our three strata, in the control 
group we find that turnout is 62.6 percent among ever-voters, substantially higher than recently registered 
non-voters (17.0 percent), which is higher still than turnout among longstanding registered non-voters 
(13.2 percent). Table 4 also indicates that the secrecy interventions increased turnout. Recently registered 
non-voters sent a secrecy letter voted in 2010 at rates 2.8 to 4.1 percentage points higher than those 
assigned to the control condition (a proportional increase of 16 to 24 percent for this stratum). Among 
longstanding registered non-voters, turnout is .2 to 4.3 percentage points higher for those sent secrecy 
letters than those in the control group (a proportional increase of 2 to 33 percent). The effect is .1 to 1.2 
percentage points among ever-voters (0 to 2 percent proportional). In short, the effects of the secrecy 
letters appear to be larger for non-voters. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
similar results. Results are available upon request. 16 
[Table 4 About Here] 
By contrast, the effects of the two placebo letters, SOS Control and SOS Short, are small for both 
recently registered non-voters (-.2 and -.7 percentage points, respectively) and longstanding registered 
non-voters (-3.1 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively). Among the ever-voters stratum, these two 
treatments each have a 2.4 percentage point effect relative to the control group. The SOS Civic Duty and 
Generic Civic Duty treatments also present modest effects relative to the control group across strata: 1.2 
and .6 percentage points among the recently registered non-voters, -2.0 and -2.5 for longstanding 
registered non-voters, and -.5 and 1.6 for ever-voters. 
We are able to detect a positive and statistically significant effect of the secrecy interventions on 
turnout in the recently registered non-voters stratum in our experiment. Difference-of-means tests are 
statistically significant for all three secrecy letters relative to the control condition (p=.04, .002, and .009 
for SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity), SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation), and SOS Combined, respectively). We 
find no statistically distinguishable difference among longstanding registered non-voters or ever-voters.
16 
We now turn to regression models to formalize these differences and to test for robustness to the inclusion 
of pre-treatment covariates, but note that regression results are consistent with the simple differences of 
means. 
In Table 5 we estimate parallel OLS regression models with robust (Huber/White) standard errors 
for each stratum. Our basic models estimate the effects of the randomly assigned treatments with no 
control variables (odd numbered columns), with a subsequent specification using measures from the voter 
file as covariates (even numbered columns).
17 In columns (1)-(6), the excluded category is assignment to 
                                                      
16 The p-values on difference of means tests comparing any of the three secrecy interventions (e.g., 
pooling the three treatments to form a single group) to either of the SOS Placebo interventions (pooling 
the placebo treatment groups into a single group) are .003 (recent registered non-voters), .330 
(longstanding registered non-voters), and .181 (ever-voters). 
17 For space reasons, Table 5 does not report the coefficients and standard errors for the voter file 17 
the control condition—individuals in our target population randomly assigned to receive no mailing of 
any kind.  
Focusing first on the results for recently registered non-voters in column (1), we find that the 
secrecy intervention increased turnout by between 2.8 and 4.0 percentage points relative to turnout in the 
control group with all three coefficients statistically significant at p<.05. No other treatments have 
statistically significant effects in this stratum, and each of the secrecy interventions has a larger effect 
than the effect of any of the other treatments.
18 The results are virtually unchanged with the addition of 
the measures from the voter file as covariates in column (2). 
Our longstanding registered non-voters stratum has a much smaller number of cases assigned to 
each treatment condition. The results reported in columns (3) and (4) reflect the small sample sizes with 
large standard errors. The pattern of findings is consistent with the notion that, as with the recently 
registered non-voters, messages based on secrecy concerns are especially effective for this subgroup. 
However, the estimates are imprecise. The only statistically significant (p<.10) coefficient is for the SOS 
Secrecy Combined treatment, with a point estimate of 5.7 percentage points in column (4). The other 
secrecy treatments have smaller positive effects—from 1.3 to 2.3 percentage points in column (4)—but 
are not statistically significant. The largest point estimate for any other treatment is less than 1 percentage 
point.  
Finally, among ever-voters (columns [5] and [6]), the only statistically significant (p<.10) effect 
is a 2.4 (column [5]) to 2.5 (column [6]) percentage point increase in turnout for the SOS Short 
intervention. The secrecy interventions are estimated to increase turnout by between .2 and 1.3 percentage 
points in column (6), but none of these effects are statistically distinguishable from zero. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
measures; Appendix Table A2 presents the full model results. 
18 The SOS Civic Duty and Generic Civic Duty treatments are associated with 1.2 and .5 percentage point 
increases in turnout, consistent with the results of published field experiments. These effects are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero in our sample, however. 18 
[Table 5 About Here] 
Overall, these results suggest that the secrecy letters increased the propensity to vote among those 
citizens who are legally registered to turn out but have no record of previously exercising that right 
(members of both the recently registered non-voters and the longstanding registered non-voters strata). 
Relative to not being sent any intervention, mailings that emphasized the protections available for ballot 
secrecy increased turnout by a statistically significant 16 to 24 percent among recently registered non-
voters, with similar but less precisely estimated effects among longstanding registered non-voters. For 
those who had ever voted, the secrecy interventions had much smaller effects that are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. The question remains as to whether these effects originate in secrecy 
concerns per se, or are instead the result of the fact that our interventions involved contact from an 
important government official and conveyed information about the upcoming election. For this reason, 
our next set of comparisons focuses on differences in outcomes between the secrecy interventions and the 
other interventions. 
Ballot Secrecy Effect Relative to Other Letters 
To isolate the effects of the content of the different treatment letters, we now examine differences 
in turnout across the different treatment letters. In columns (7) through (12) of Table 5, we repeat our 
earlier statistical analysis but now include only those respondents sent one of the secrecy interventions or 
either of the placebo interventions sent on SOS letterhead (SOS Short and SOS Control). As there is no 
statistically significant difference between the two SOS placebo treatments in any strata in columns (1)-
(6), we pool these treatments and use them as the excluded comparison category (we refer to those pooled 
treatments as SOS Placebo). Additionally, we pool the three secrecy treatments (SOS Secrecy 1 
(Anonymity), SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation), and SOS Secrecy Combined) into Any Secrecy Treatment, 
coded 1 for an individual assigned to any of the three secrecy interventions. Thus, the coefficient for Any 
Secrecy Treatment is the effect of assignment to any of the three secrecy letters relative to the effect of 
assignment to either SOS Placebo. 19 
Comparing Any Secrecy Treatment to SOS Placebo is particularly compelling because the two 
placebo messages allow us to distinguish the effect of the secrecy content from both (1) contact by the 
Secretary of State and (2) the communication of information about the upcoming election and the 
Secretary’s efforts in overseeing and administering election rules. The statistically significant .039 and 
.038 coefficients (p<.01) on Any Secrecy Treatment in columns (7) and (8) indicate that among the 
recently registered non-voters the average effect of the secrecy interventions was to increase turnout by 
about four percentage points relative to the average effect of the two SOS placebo messages. Overall, this 
is a substantial increase in turnout for a relatively straightforward set of interventions that communicate 
factual information about the voting process to inexperienced voters. Additionally, the fact that the 
secrecy interventions each have larger point estimates than either the SOS Civic Duty or Generic Civic 
Duty messages (in columns [1] and [2]) implies that addressing secrecy concerns is not increasing turnout 
simply by making voters believe they have a greater obligation to vote. 
Turning to the other two strata, among the longstanding registered non-voters (columns [9] and 
[10]) the effect of Any Secrecy Treatment is roughly similar to that for recently registered non-voters, 3.0 
in column (9) without covariates and 4.4 percentage points in column (10) with covariates, but is not 
statistically distinguishable from the effects of the placebo treatments. Finally, among ever-voters, the 
effect of Any Secrecy Treatment is a negative 1.6 (1.4) percentage points relative to the placebo messages 
in column (11) (column [12]), but this effect is also not statistically significant (p=.18 and .19).  The 
effects among recently registered non-voters appear distinct from those among ever-voters, with 
confidence intervals on the effects that do not overlap.
19 It is interesting that for experienced voters, we 
find that the two placebo messages are associated with the largest increase in turnout relative to the 
                                                      
19 Ninety-five percent confidence intervals for the Any Secrecy Treatment coefficient in the non-covariate 
specifications in columns (7) and (11) of Table 5 are [1.34, 6.51] and [-3.9, 0.73], respectively. 20 
control (see columns [5] and [6]). These placebo interventions mentioned the upcoming election and (for 
the SOS Control letter) the Secretary of State’s responsibilities in helping to administer elections.
20 
Finally, we consider whether there is any evidence that the effect of the secrecy interventions 
follows a dose-response pattern among recently registered non-voters (small cell sizes make comparisons 
for longstanding registered non-voters infeasible). Direct inspection of the coefficients in column (2) of 
Table 5 suggests that the combined effects of the two secrecy arguments from SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) 
and SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) in SOS Secrecy Combined do not generate a cumulative effect equal 
to the sum of the individual messages. The combined message increases turnout by only 1 percentage 
point relative to SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) and only .3 percentage points relative to SOS Secrecy 2 (No 
Intimidation). More formally, testing whether the coefficient(s) on (SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) + SOS 
Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation)) - SOS Secrecy Combined is equal to zero yields a p-value of .28. Thus, 
although we cannot rule out (statistically) the possibility that the effect of the combined treatment is equal 
to the sum of the individual treatments, the sum of the coefficients on the SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) and 
SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) is 2.6 percentage points greater than the coefficient on the SOS Secrecy 
Combined variable and 68% larger than that coefficient. 
In sum, the regression results replicate the difference of means results in Table 4. We find that 
letters providing information about the formal and administrative protections of the ballot increase 
turnout. These effects are statistically significantly larger than the effects of other election correspondence 
from the Secretary of State; the effects are also larger than (but not statistically distinguishable from) the 
effects of standard civic duty appeals. When compared to a placebo intervention letter also sent from the 
                                                      
20 By contrast the SOS Civic Duty message is associated with a -.9 percentage point decrease in turnout 
relative to control, which is a -3.3 (with rounding) percentage point effect relative to the SOS Short 
placebo message (p=.043). The SOS Civic Duty letter is identical to the SOS Short letter with the addition 
of text emphasizing the civic duty associated with voting. We offer no speculation as to why experienced 
voters might have reacted negatively to this effort to promote the civic duty of voting. 21 
Secretary of State about the election, but providing information about the election other than about the 
secrecy of the ballot, we find that the effect of the secret ballot treatment is limited to registrants who had 
not previously voted, while registrants who had previously voted appear to be no more responsive to 
secrecy information than to other election information from the Secretary of State. 
IV.  Discussion 
In this research we used a multi-stage research design to examine public perceptions about ballot 
secrecy as well as whether those registered voters most likely to have doubts about secrecy are more 
likely to vote after being provided with information about the voting process. Our survey evidence shows 
that despite the formal institutional practice of government supervised and administered elections with 
longstanding protections for ballot secrecy, many people say they harbor doubts about the secrecy of the 
voting process. These doubts are particularly concentrated among those who have not voted before. The 
findings from the field experiment suggest a relationship between doubts about ballot secrecy and the 
decision to participate in elections in the contemporary United States. We find that an intervention 
providing simple information about ballot secrecy protections increased participation among recent 
registrants who have not previously participated. The magnitude of this effect was substantial and larger 
than the effects typically found for a single GOTV mailing. While only 17.0% of the individuals in this 
group who were not sent a letter turned out to vote, 20.4% of those sent a letter containing information 
about ballot secrecy protections turned out—a proportional increase of 20%. Taken together, our survey 
and field experiment findings are consistent with the argument that the beliefs about secrecy that people 
express in surveys are both real and somewhat remediable—when these doubts are addressed, 
participation increases among this group.  
More broadly, this work illustrates that an important area for research is to understand the sources 
and consequences of beliefs about the operation of political institutions. Our findings suggest that beliefs 
about how a political institution works can be politically consequential, even if they are at odds with the 
reality of how that institution operates. We note that our focus on beliefs about ballot secrecy in the 
context of elections in the contemporary United States is in many ways a “difficult case.” In countries 22 
with new electoral institutions, doubts about secrecy may be more prevalent and depress turnout, even in 
cases where the institutions are well-designed and properly implemented. Therefore, an especially 
promising avenue for research deals with beliefs about the operation of electoral institutions in other 
countries.  
Similarly, our findings suggest that in order to understand how changes to election procedures in 
the U.S. and other long-standing democracies affect behavior, it is important to consider how the public 
understands the new institution. Evidence from our field experiment suggests that sending letters that 
provide simple information about the secrecy of the voting process may correct errant perceptions about 
that process and thereby substantially increase turnout among a group of individuals who are typically 
difficult to mobilize—those who are registered to vote but have not voted before. This specific 
informational intervention is unlikely to be the only such intervention that can motivate participation for 
those groups that currently abstain from voting in elections. If comparable misperceptions about other 
institutional procedures exist, they too may have important consequences for patterns of participation. 
Remedying such misperceptions is particularly important given that these beliefs may be self sustaining—
someone who chooses not to participate because they doubt the secrecy of the ballot effectively shields 
herself from learning about secrecy protections by failing to engage in the voting process. Similarly, 
someone who doubts votes for the opposition are counted fairly may choose not to vote, ensuring that 
fewer votes for the opposition are cast, which, even if elections are conducted properly, may reinforce 
doubts about the legitimacy of election institutions and further deter participation. 
The treatment effects we find originating in a single letter sent in the days before an election 
might be a lower bound relative to the effect of a more sustained and broad-based public education 
campaign. An area for subsequent research would be to examine the effect of embedding education about 
ballot secrecy into voter registration initiatives so as to directly address any mistaken beliefs ahead of 
time. One could also conduct standard opinion surveys before and after any such intervention to assess 
changes in these attitudes and measure the relative contribution of changes in secrecy attitudes to changes 
in participation. Indeed, one remaining question is whether doubts about secrecy are an impediment to 23 
registering in the first place. Our experiment only includes registrants (because only they are eligible to 
vote). It could be the case that the interventions we used would be even more consequential among those 
who have previously been unwilling to even register. 
Additional areas for ongoing research include whether the effects of addressing doubts about 
ballot secrecy generate a persistent change in behavior and affect other registrants in the voter’s 
household. Regarding the former, if doubts about ballot secrecy do stem from lack of information about 
how elections are conducted, then addressing those concerns should permanently remove a persistent 
barrier to participation and yield long term changes in patterns of participation. Examining how our 
treatments and similar treatments affect participation in subsequent elections is a natural next step. 
Finally, there are questions of generalizability and replicability. Given the size of our experiment 
and the use of random assignment, it is unlikely that our estimates of treatment effects are entirely 
spurious. However, one should also be cautious in assuming that similar results would hold in other states 
and in other electoral contexts (e.g., presidential or purely local elections). Beliefs about secrecy may also 
vary, even among inexperienced voters, based on things such as generational experiences with technology 
or observing shared public events that affect generational beliefs. Repeating this experiment in other 
states and including non-registrants will be important for measuring the importance and robustness of this 
effect. These caveats aside, the data presented here indicate that beliefs about ballot secrecy may be an 
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% Yes % Don't Remember/Don't Know % No
Source: 2010 Ballot Secrecy Survey. Cell entries are weighted percentages. Ever-Voters include those whose last reported vote was in person (early or on Election 
Day); 19% of survey respondents reported voting absentee, by mail, or could not recall how they last voted and are excluded from this analysis. Empty cells are 2.6% 
Yes and 1.6% DR/DK for Ever-Voters to "...ask you who you were voting for?" and 2.7% Yes for Ever-Voters to "...see who you voted for?". All differences in 
distributions of responses between Ever- and Non-voters are statistically significant at p<.05 (test-statistic calculated with a weighted multinomial logit regression 
predicting responses with an indicator for Non-voters, robust [Huber/White] standard errors). N ranges from 2418 to 2429. Stage 1: Select Eligible Sample
Randomly select a single registrant in every household from eligible active registrants in Connecticut Voter File (June, 2010).
Eligible registrants are those:
   (1) age 18-85,
   (2) with a valid Connecticut mailing address (mailable and current per NCOA list, October 2010) that is not a PO Box,
   (3) who had not voted absentee in 2006, 2008, or 2010, and
   (4) who are not from a household with more than 5 registrants at a single address.
Stage 2: Identify Strata
There are 3 Treatment Strata:
   Recently registered non-voters: Those who registered after the November 2004 election and have never voted.
   Longstanding registered non-voters: Those who registered on or before the November 2004 election and have never voted.
   Ever-voters: All other registrants who have ever voted.
Stage 3: Assign Treatments
There are Seven Treatment Mailings and an untreated Control Group (Treatment assignment within each Stratum is detailed in Table 3):
   Secrecy Treatments: (1) SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity), (2) SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation), (3) SOS Secrecy Combined
   Placebo Treatments: (4) SOS Short, (5) SOS Control
   Civic Duty Treatments: (6) SOS Civic Duty, (7) Generic ("Connecticut Votes") Civic Duty
Stage 4: Collect Post-Treatment Data Code 2010 Participation from Connecticut Voter file; unmatched cases count as not voting.
Note: SOS=Secretary of State; NCOA=National Change of Address.
Table 1: Field Experiment Design(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Control Group
Treatment: 
SOS Secrecy 1 
(Anonymity)
Treatment: 

















Stratum 1: Recently Registered Non-Voters
Age 38.265 38.210 38.753 38.299 38.077 38.022 38.384 38.358 0.996
[17.3004] [17.1644] [17.4871] [17.2638] [17.2605] [17.268] [17.4398] [17.6576]
Sex: Male 0.435 0.444 0.480 0.451 0.456 0.418 0.451 0.430 0.167
[.4958] [.4972] [.4999] [.4979] [.4984] [.4935] [.4979] [.4954]
Sex: Unlisted 0.062 0.070 0.049 0.061 0.057 0.068 0.073 0.059 0.573
[.2411] [.256] [.2165] [.2396] [.2315] [.2511] [.2603] [.2366]
Registered Democrat 0.304 0.319 0.310 0.310 0.298 0.323 0.299 0.306 0.922
[.4599] [.4664] [.4629] [.4628] [.4575] [.4681] [.4582] [.4611]
Registered Republican 0.118 0.112 0.129 0.121 0.129 0.115 0.141 0.118 0.517
[.3228] [.3151] [.3357] [.3262] [.3353] [.3188] [.3484] [.3223]
Number in Household: 1 0.498 0.482 0.479 0.546 0.503 0.502 0.482 0.494 0.160
[.5] [.5] [.4999] [.4982] [.5004] [.5004] [.5] [.5003]
Number in Household: 2 0.276 0.259 0.281 0.230 0.282 0.253 0.257 0.269 0.068
[.4469] [.4381] [.4497] [.4208] [.4504] [.4349] [.4371] [.4439]
Number in Household: 3 0.149 0.174 0.164 0.145 0.156 0.166 0.163 0.150 0.297
[.3557] [.3789] [.3703] [.3526] [.3636] [.3727] [.3696] [.3577]
Number in Household: 4 0.062 0.070 0.062 0.062 0.046 0.058 0.075 0.072 0.343
[.2412] [.256] [.2405] [.2418] [.2097] [.2341] [.2642] [.2588]
Town=Bridgeport 0.058 0.056 0.065 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.047 0.875
[.2328] [.2297] [.2472] [.2396] [.2402] [.237] [.2369] [.2113]
Town=New Haven 0.040 0.044 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.031 0.041 0.038 0.880
[.1959] [.2045] [.2032] [.2105] [.2063] [.1745] [.1992] [.1911]
Town=Stamford 0.027 0.021 0.026 0.031 0.037 0.028 0.028 0.022 0.655
[.1626] [.1422] [.1588] [.1721] [.1884] [.1658] [.165] [.1451]
Town=Hartford 0.044 0.053 0.048 0.045 0.045 0.031 0.043 0.034 0.501
[.2047] [.225] [.214] [.2078] [.2063] [.1745] [.202] [.1817]
Town=Waterbury 0.038 0.034 0.026 0.038 0.043 0.041 0.035 0.044 0.629
[.1917] [.1813] [.1588] [.191] [.2029] [.198] [.1846] [.2058]
Town=Norwalk 0.019 0.026 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.016 0.026 0.016 0.322
[.1363] [.1577] [.1207] [.1152] [.1102] [.1244] [.1579] [.1272]
Observations 64131 824 812 819 652 637 822 791
P-value on Exact Randomization Test
Table 2a: Summary Statistics for Treatment Stratum by Intervention Assignment
0.407
Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviation in brackets. Source: Connecticut Voter File. F-Test p-values are from regression models predicting each covariate with a set of indicators for 
each intervention.  See text for discussion of exact randomization test.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Control Group
Treatment: 
SOS Secrecy 1 
(Anonymity)
Treatment: 

















Stratum 2: Longstanding Registered Non-Voters
Age 48.254 48.689 46.830 48.377 47.333 47.505 48.539 48.777 0.952
[15.1182] [15.708] [15.2034] [14.096] [15.8961] [14.8285] [15.3997] [16.2488]
Sex: Male 0.391 0.420 0.407 0.263 0.467 0.374 0.378 0.397 0.131
[.488] [.4957] [.4932] [.4423] [.5013] [.4863] [.4865] [.4912]
Sex: Unlisted 0.145 0.185 0.126 0.175 0.143 0.121 0.203 0.124 0.370
[.3516] [.3898] [.333] [.382] [.3516] [.328] [.4035] [.3309]
Registered Democrat 0.311 0.286 0.326 0.360 0.295 0.253 0.329 0.306 0.816
[.463] [.4537] [.4705] [.482] [.4583] [.4367] [.4714] [.4627]
Registered Republican 0.140 0.126 0.163 0.088 0.171 0.111 0.147 0.141 0.663
[.3471] [.3333] [.3707] [.2841] [.3787] [.3159] [.3552] [.3489]
Number in Household: 1 0.497 0.555 0.496 0.579 0.410 0.485 0.532 0.488 0.282
[.5] [.4991] [.5018] [.4959] [.4941] [.5023] [.5008] [.5019]
Number in Household: 2 0.299 0.210 0.267 0.254 0.352 0.253 0.294 0.322 0.252
[.4578] [.4091] [.4439] [.4374] [.48] [.4367] [.4571] [.4693]
Number in Household: 3 0.137 0.168 0.119 0.105 0.200 0.212 0.119 0.141 0.139
[.3438] [.3755] [.3244] [.3082] [.4019] [.4109] [.3248] [.3489]
Number in Household: 4 0.053 0.050 0.082 0.053 0.029 0.051 0.042 0.041 0.764
[.2239] [.2197] [.2746] [.2243] [.1674] [.2201] [.2012] [.1999]
Town=Bridgeport 0.068 0.059 0.096 0.079 0.076 0.020 0.091 0.074 0.425
[.2516] [.2363] [.2961] [.2708] [.2666] [.1414] [.2885] [.2635]
Town=New Haven 0.050 0.076 0.067 0.070 0.048 0.040 0.063 0.050 0.771
[.218] [.2655] [.2504] [.2566] [.214] [.1979] [.2437] [.218]
Town=Stamford 0.034 0.025 0.030 0.044 0.010 0.010 0.028 0.041 0.701
[.181] [.1574] [.1702] [.2057] [.0976] [.1005] [.1655] [.1999]
Town=Hartford 0.039 0.034 0.030 0.026 0.048 0.051 0.070 0.033 0.625
[.1929] [.181] [.1702] [.1608] [.214] [.2201] [.2559] [.1795]
Town=Waterbury 0.084 0.076 0.082 0.088 0.095 0.111 0.084 0.066 0.973
[.2779] [.2655] [.2746] [.2841] [.295] [.3159] [.2782] [.2495]
Town=Norwalk 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.765
[.0757] [.0937] [.1005]
Observations 68023 119 135 114 105 99 143 121
P-value on Exact Randomization Test
Table 2b: Summary Statistics for Treatment Stratum by Intervention Assignment
0.678
Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviation in brackets. Source: Connecticut Voter File. F-Test p-values are from regression models predicting each covariate with a set of indicators for 
each intervention.  See text for discussion of exact randomization test.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Control Group
Treatment: 
SOS Secrecy 1 
(Anonymity)
Treatment: 

















Stratum 3: Ever Voters
Voted 2006 0.523 0.529 0.526 0.523 0.521 0.532 0.528 0.532 0.996
[.4995] [.4993] [.4995] [.4996] [.4998] [.4992] [.4994] [.4991]
Voted 2004 0.618 0.616 0.613 0.608 0.618 0.610 0.610 0.616 0.995
[.4859] [.4866] [.4872] [.4883] [.4861] [.4879] [.4878] [.4866]
Voted 2008 0.888 0.890 0.885 0.885 0.888 0.895 0.895 0.889 0.981
[.3154] [.313] [.3188] [.3192] [.3157] [.3065] [.3073] [.3141]
Age 52.158 51.979 51.892 52.173 52.445 51.986 51.694 51.504 0.761
[15.7728] [15.6388] [15.5082] [15.7735] [15.6856] [15.7316] [15.6557] [16.0351]
Sex: Male 0.374 0.356 0.374 0.379 0.387 0.366 0.377 0.371 0.808
[.4838] [.4788] [.4841] [.4854] [.4872] [.4819] [.4848] [.4832]
Sex: Unlisted 0.133 0.141 0.131 0.128 0.114 0.128 0.136 0.145 0.376
[.34] [.3478] [.3378] [.3345] [.3176] [.3343] [.3433] [.3519]
Registered Democrat 0.381 0.380 0.418 0.386 0.382 0.362 0.365 0.370 0.060
[.4858] [.4856] [.4933] [.4869] [.4861] [.4807] [.4815] [.4829]
Registered Republican 0.214 0.196 0.207 0.192 0.204 0.224 0.231 0.220 0.094
[.4102] [.3973] [.4054] [.3936] [.4031] [.4172] [.4215] [.4143]
Number in Household: 1 0.369 0.380 0.372 0.355 0.381 0.356 0.359 0.351 0.499
[.4826] [.4855] [.4834] [.4785] [.4859] [.4789] [.4798] [.4775]
Number in Household: 2 0.445 0.444 0.440 0.459 0.437 0.456 0.457 0.461 0.765
[.497] [.497] [.4965] [.4985] [.4962] [.4983] [.4983] [.4986]
Number in Household: 3 0.128 0.120 0.139 0.124 0.122 0.128 0.125 0.123 0.824
[.3346] [.3253] [.346] [.3296] [.3269] [.3343] [.3306] [.3286]
Number in Household: 4 0.046 0.048 0.041 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.689
[.2097] [.2137] [.1993] [.2192] [.22] [.2189] [.217] [.2289]
Town=Bridgeport 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.999
[.173] [.1743] [.1757] [.1784] [.1744] [.1674] [.1695] [.1774]
Town=New Haven 0.036 0.034 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.583
[.1857] [.181] [.1557] [.1864] [.1904] [.1803] [.1815] [.1757]
Town=Stamford 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.035 0.031 0.989
[.175] [.1777] [.1807] [.1864] [.1806] [.1761] [.1831] [.174]
Town=Hartford 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.022 0.028 0.022 0.020 0.023 0.598
[.1563] [.1394] [.167] [.1471] [.1657] [.1481] [.1398] [.1498]
Town=Waterbury 0.026 0.029 0.029 0.026 0.028 0.030 0.023 0.028 0.931
[.1589] [.169] [.1688] [.1589] [.1657] [.1696] [.1504] [.1651]
Town=Norwalk 0.028 0.021 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.764
[.1642] [.1438] [.1518] [.1627] [.1701] [.1507] [.1545] [.1577]
Observations 8223 1564 1569 1582 1275 1249 1555 1569
P-value on Exact Randomization Test
Table 2c: Summary Statistics for Treatment Stratum by Intervention Assignment
Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviation in brackets. Source: Connecticut Voter File. F-Test p-values are from regression models predicting each covariate with a set of indicators for 








Control Group 64131 68023 8223
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) 824 119 1564
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) 812 135 1569
Treatment: SOS Secrecy Combined 819 114 1582
Treatment: SOS Short (Placebo) 652 105 1275
Treatment: SOS Control (Placebo) 637 99 1249
Treatment: SOS Civic Duty 822 143 1555
Treatment: Generic Civic Duty 791 121 1569
Stratum
Table 3: Counts of Control and Treatment Assignment by Stratum
Note: Cell entries are counts of registrants assigned to that condition in that stratum.Figure 2: Diagram of Sample Definition, Points of Attrition, and Treatment Assignments
Note: For treatment breakdown by stratum, see Table 3.
Starting Sample [2,369,593]
Active registrants, Age less than 86 and more than 17,
CT mailing address, Less than six at address, Not PO Box,
Not absentee voter
Population Filters [1,527,658]
Sample One Person Per Household [894,791]
Sample Checked Against NCOA [179,316]
Good Address/Not PO Box Per NCOA [156,933]
No Mail Control [140,377]
SOS Short (Placebo) 2,032
Assigned to Treatment [16,556] SOS Control (Placebo) 1,985
Generic Civic Duty 2,481
SOS Civic Duty 2,520
SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonmity) 2,507
SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) 2,516







Control Group 17.0% 13.2% 62.6%
(0.1) (0.1) (0.5)
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) 19.8 13.4 62.7
(1.4) (3.1) (1.2)
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) 21.1 14.8 63.8
(1.4) (3.1) (1.2)
Treatment: SOS Secrecy Combined 20.5 17.5 63.7
(1.4) (3.6) (1.2)
Treatment: SOS Short (Placebo) 16.3 14.3 64.9
(1.4) (3.4) (1.3)
Treatment: SOS Control (Placebo) 16.8 10.1 65.0
(1.5) (3) (1.4)
Treatment: SOS Civic Duty 18.2 11.2 62.1
(1.3) (2.6) (1.2)
Treatment: Generic Civic Duty 17.6 10.7 64.2
(1.4) (2.8) (1.2)
Stratum
Note: Cell entries are percentage voting as recorded in CT Voter File, standard errors in 
parentheses calculated from test of sample proportion. Registrants not matched to post-
election file counted as non-voters.




Treatment: SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) 0.028 0.028 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.002
[0.014]** [0.014]** [0.031] [0.030] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) 0.040 0.035 0.016 0.023 0.012 0.010
[0.014]*** [0.014]** [0.031] [0.028] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: SOS Secrecy Combined 0.035 0.038 0.043 0.057 0.011 0.013
[0.014]** [0.014]*** [0.036] [0.034]* [0.013] [0.012]
Any Secrecy Treatment 0.039 0.038 0.030 0.044 -0.016 -0.014
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.030] [0.029] [0.012] [0.011]
Treatment: SOS Short (Placebo) -0.008 -0.008 0.011 0.009 0.024 0.025
[0.015] [0.014] [0.034] [0.031] [0.014]* [0.013]*
Treatment: SOS Control (Placebo) -0.002 -0.001 -0.031 -0.028 0.024 0.020
[0.015] [0.015] [0.030] [0.029] [0.015]* [0.013]
Treatment: SOS Civic Duty 0.012 0.010 -0.020 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009
[0.014] [0.013] [0.026] [0.025] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: Generic Civic Duty 0.005 0.005 -0.025 -0.031 0.016 0.016
[0.014] [0.013] [0.028] [0.029] [0.013] [0.012]
Constant 0.170 0.185 0.132 0.132 0.626 0.154 0.165 0.281 0.123 -0.019 0.650 0.277
[0.001]*** [0.011]*** [0.001]*** [0.010]*** [0.005]*** [0.036]*** [0.010]*** [0.058]*** [0.023]*** [0.050] [0.009]*** [0.060]***
Observations 69488 69488 68859 68859 18586 18586 3744 3744 572 572 7239 7239
R-squared 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.191 0.002 0.052 0.002 0.137 0.000 0.178
F-Test p-value on joint significance of three Secrecy Treatments 0.001 0.001 0.621 0.304 0.700 0.657 0.003 0.003 0.319 0.122 0.180 0.187
F-Test p-value on joint significance of two SOS Placebos 0.858 0.845 0.564 0.590 0.087 0.070 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Covariates included? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Results from OLS Regressions with dependent variable 2010 turnout (1=yes, 0=no or no record in post-election voter file). Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Full model 
results, including covariates, available in Appendix Table A2. Covariates are turnout indicators for 2004, 2006, and 2008, age, age squared, gender, party of registration, number in household indicators, and town indicators for six largest 
Connecticut towns (Bridgeport, New Haven, Stamford, Hartford, Waterbury, and Norwalk).
All Assignments and Control
Restricted to those assigned to Placebo (SOS Short and SOS Control)
 or Any Secrecy (SOS Secrecy 1, SOS Secrecy 2, SOS Secrecy Combined)
To Control (Omitted Category) To Placebo Treatments (Omitted Category)




















Voted 2006 (1=yes) 0.525
[.4994]
Voted 2004 (1=yes) 0.615
[.4865]
Voted 2008 (1=yes) 0.889
[.3144]
Age (years) 38.269 48.251 52.036
[17.3049] [15.1207] [15.7421]
Sex: Male 0.436 0.391 0.373
[.4959] [.488] [.4836]
Sex: Unlisted 0.062 0.145 0.133
[.2412] [.3517] [.3395]
Registered Democrat 0.304 0.311 0.381
[.4601] [.463] [.4857]
Registered Republican 0.119 0.140 0.212
[.3233] [.3471] [.4087]
Number in Household: 1 0.498 0.497 0.367
[.5] [.5] [.4818]
Number in Household: 2 0.275 0.299 0.448
[.4463] [.4577] [.4973]
Number in Household: 3 0.150 0.137 0.127
[.3566] [.3439] [.333]
Number in Household: 4 0.062 0.053 0.048
[.2415] [.2238] [.2136]
Town=Bridgeport 0.058 0.068 0.031
[.2329] [.2517] [.1736]
Town=New Haven 0.040 0.050 0.034
[.1961] [.2182] [.1818]
Town=Stamford 0.027 0.034 0.033
[.1625] [.1808] [.1777]
Town=Hartford 0.044 0.039 0.024
[.2045] [.193] [.1534]
Town=Waterbury 0.038 0.084 0.027
[.1914] [.2779] [.1616]
Town=Norwalk 0.019 0.006 0.026
[.136] [.0754] [.1596]
Observations 69488 68859 18586
Chi-squared statistic for joint significance of covariates 
from voter file in multinomial logit explaining treatment 
assignment 91.735 1964.713 82.936
P-value on Exact Randomization Test 0.407 0.678 0.309
Table A1: Summary Statistics for Each Stratum
Stratum
Note: Cell entries are means with standard deviation in brackets. Source: Connecticut Voter File. See text for 
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Densities are from 2000 independent alternative randomizations, top−coded at 95th percentile for graphing purposes. Beginning at left, empirical p−values in each cell are 0.407, 0.678, and 0.309.
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Treatment: SOS Secrecy 1 (Anonymity) 0.028 0.028 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.002
[0.014]** [0.014]** [0.031] [0.030] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: SOS Secrecy 2 (No Intimidation) 0.040 0.035 0.016 0.023 0.012 0.010
[0.014]*** [0.014]** [0.031] [0.028] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: SOS Secrecy Combined 0.035 0.038 0.043 0.057 0.011 0.013
[0.014]** [0.014]*** [0.036] [0.034]* [0.013] [0.012]
Any Secrecy Treatment 0.039 0.038 0.030 0.044 -0.016 -0.014
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.030] [0.029] [0.012] [0.011]
Treatment: SOS Short (Placebo) -0.008 -0.008 0.011 0.009 0.024 0.025
[0.015] [0.014] [0.034] [0.031] [0.014]* [0.013]*
Treatment: SOS Control (Placebo) -0.002 -0.001 -0.031 -0.028 0.024 0.020
[0.015] [0.015] [0.030] [0.029] [0.015]* [0.013]
Treatment: SOS Civic Duty 0.012 0.010 -0.020 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009
[0.014] [0.013] [0.026] [0.025] [0.013] [0.012]
Treatment: Generic Civic Duty 0.005 0.005 -0.025 -0.031 0.016 0.016
[0.014] [0.013] [0.028] [0.029] [0.013] [0.012]
Voted 2006 0.227 0.210
[0.008]*** [0.013]***
Voted 2004 0.009 0.008
[0.008] [0.012]
Voted 2008 0.241 0.244
[0.011]*** [0.017]***
Age (mean-deviated) 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.010 0.006 0.019
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.006] [0.002]***
Age-Squared (in hundreds, mean-deviated) -0.007 -0.005 -0.015 -0.008 -0.002 -0.014
[0.000]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.006] [0.002]***
Sex: Male 0.003 -0.001 0.025 0.014 -0.043 0.028
[0.003] [0.003] [0.007]*** [0.013] [0.032] [0.011]**
Sex: Unlisted -0.090 -0.111 0.022 -0.146 -0.175 0.017
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.010]** [0.024]*** [0.037]*** [0.017]
Registered Democrat 0.049 0.019 0.077 0.021 0.053 0.080
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.008]*** [0.014] [0.032]* [0.012]***
Registered Republican 0.147 0.096 0.130 0.141 0.195 0.138
[0.005]*** [0.004]*** [0.009]*** [0.023]*** [0.055]*** [0.014]***
Number in Household: 1 -0.040 -0.023 -0.030 -0.135 0.123 -0.123
[0.011]*** [0.009]** [0.034] [0.057]** [0.045]*** [0.057]**
Number in Household: 2 0.027 0.064 0.048 -0.059 0.187 -0.044
[0.011]** [0.010]*** [0.034] [0.058] [0.051]*** [0.057]
Number in Household: 3 -0.002 0.013 0.005 -0.105 0.211 -0.089
[0.011] [0.010] [0.035] [0.058]* [0.054]*** [0.058]
Number in Household: 4 -0.003 0.015 0.038 -0.045 0.172 -0.069
[0.012] [0.011] [0.036] [0.063] [0.072]** [0.060]
Town=Bridgeport -0.097 -0.143 -0.063 -0.096 -0.144 -0.080
[0.005]*** [0.003]*** [0.019]*** [0.022]*** [0.037]*** [0.031]**
Town=New Haven -0.057 -0.103 -0.038 -0.062 -0.093 -0.034
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.017]** [0.028]** [0.044]** [0.028]
Town=Stamford 0.030 -0.034 0.173 0.024 -0.096 0.168
[0.009]*** [0.007]*** [0.019]*** [0.040] [0.080] [0.031]***
Town=Hartford -0.056 -0.127 -0.061 -0.045 -0.163 -0.095
[0.006]*** [0.004]*** [0.021]*** [0.029] [0.031]*** [0.035]***
Town=Waterbury -0.088 -0.136 -0.030 -0.096 -0.132 -0.022
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.020] [0.027]*** [0.030]*** [0.031]
Town=Norwalk 0.026 -0.124 0.006 -0.064 -0.129 0.011
[0.011]** [0.010]*** [0.019] [0.046] [0.080] [0.031]
Constant 0.170 0.185 0.132 0.132 0.626 0.154 0.165 0.281 0.123 -0.019 0.650 0.277
[0.001]*** [0.011]*** [0.001]*** [0.010]*** [0.005]*** [0.036]*** [0.010]*** [0.058]*** [0.023]*** [0.050] [0.009]*** [0.060]***
Observations 69488 69488 68859 68859 18586 18586 3744 3744 572 572 7239 7239
R-squared 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.191 0.002 0.052 0.002 0.137 0.000 0.178
F-Test p-value on three Secrecy Treatments 0.001 0.001 0.621 0.304 0.700 0.657 0.003 0.003 0.319 0.122 0.180 0.187
F-Test p-value on two SOS Placebos 0.858 0.845 0.564 0.590 0.087 0.070 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Covariates included? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table A2: OLS Regressions Predicting 2010 Turnout by Stratum; Full Model Results
Note: Results from OLS Regressions with dependent variable 2010 turnout (1=yes, 0=no or no record in post-election voter file). Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 












Ever Voters, Pooled 
Secrecy vs. Placebo
All Assignments and Control
Restricted to those assigned to Placebo (SOS Short and SOS Control)
 or Any Secrecy (SOS Secrecy 1, SOS Secrecy 2, SOS Secrecy Combined)
To Control (Omitted Category) To Placebo Treatments (Omitted Category)